Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC model by Pope, Gregory C. et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Economics BU Open Access Articles
2004
Risk adjustment of Medicare
capitation payments using the
CMS-HCC model
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version
Citation (published version): Gregory C Pope, John Kautter, Randall P Ellis, Arlene S Ash, John Z
Ayanian, Lisa I Lezzoni, Melvin J Ingber, Jesse M Levy, John Robst.
2004. "Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the
CMS-HCC model.." Health Care Financ Rev, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp.
119 - 141.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/26741
Boston University
This article describes the CMS hierarchi-
cal condition categories (HCC) model imple-
mented in 2004 to adjust Medicare capita-
tion payments to private health care plans for
the health expenditure risk of their enrollees.
We explain the model’s principles, elements,
organization, calibration, and performance.
Modifications to reduce plan data reporting
burden and adaptations for disabled, institu-
tionalized, newly enrolled, and secondary-
payer subpopulations are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION
Medicare is one of the world’s largest
health insurance programs, with annual
expenditures exceeding $200 billion. It pro-
vides health insurance to nearly 40 million
beneficiaries entitled by elderly age, dis-
ability, or ESRD. Approximately 11 percent
of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in
private managed care health care plans,
with the rest in the traditional FFS pro-
gram. The 1997 BBA modified the
Medicare managed care (MMC) and other
capitated programs, collectively called
M+C.1 Medicare pays private plans partici-
pating in M+C a monthly capitation rate to
provide health care services to enrolled
beneficiaries.
Historically, capitation payments to
MMC plans were linked to FFS expendi-
tures by geographic area, with payments
set at 95 percent of an enrollee’s county’s
adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC).
The AAPCC actuarial rate cells were
defined by: age, sex, Medicaid enrollment
(indicating poverty), institutional status
(for nursing home residents), and working
aged status (for beneficiaries with employ-
er-based insurance where Medicare is a
secondary payer). Separate county factors
were calculated for the aged and non-aged
disabled (under 65 years), and at the State-
level only (due to small numbers), for
ESRD-entitled beneficiaries.
The AAPCC payment methodology
explains only about 1-percent of the varia-
tion in expenditures for Medicare benefi-
ciaries, and does not pay more for sicker
people. Thus, research showed that the
managed care program was increasing
total Medicare Program expenditures,
because its enrollees were healthier than
FFS enrollees, and the AAPCC did not
account for this favorable selection (Brown
et al., 1993; Riley et al., 1996; Mello et al.,
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1 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) renames the M+C program
Medicare Advantage. However, since this renaming does not
officially take place until 2006, we continue to use M+C. 
2003). Also, more money was not directed
to plans enrolling sicker beneficiaries, or to
plans specializing in treating high-cost pop-
ulations, such as beneficiaries with particu-
lar chronic diseases or high levels of func-
tional impairment.
The M+C program fundamentally
changed the MMC payment method,
including a mandate for health-based
Medicare capitation payments by 2000. To
support this mandate, the BBA required
managed care organizations (MCOs) to
report inpatient encounter data (i.e.,
records for each inpatient admission of a
plan’s enrollees noting, among other
things, the beneficiaries’ diagnoses) begin-
ning in 1998. In 2000 CMS, which adminis-
ters the Medicare Program, implemented
the PIP-DCG model as a health-based pay-
ment adjuster (Pope et al., 2000a). This
model estimates beneficiary health status
(expected cost next year) from AAPCC-
like demographics and the worst principal
inpatient diagnosis (principal reason for
inpatient stay) associated with any hospital
admission. PIP-DCG-based payments were
introduced gradually, with only 10 percent
of total Medicare capitation payments
adjusted by PIP-DCG factors in 2000. The
other 90 percent of payments were still
adjusted using a purely demographic
(AAPCC-like) model.
The PIP-DCG model was intended as a
transition, a feasible way to implement risk
adjustment based on the readily available,
already audited inpatient diagnostic data.
Relying on inpatient diagnoses is the PIP-
DCG model’s major shortcoming, since
only illnesses that result in hospital admis-
sions are counted; MCOs that reduce
admis-sions (e.g., through good ambulato-
ry care) can end up with apparently health-
ier patients and lower payments.
Congress’s BIPA (2000) addressed the
PIP-DCG limitations by requiring the use
of ambulatory diagnoses in Medicare risk-
adjustment, to be phased in from 2004 to
2007 at 30, 50, 75, and 100 percent of total
payments. CMS began collecting encounter
data from MCOs for the physician office
and hospital outpatient settings (i.e.,
records of each enrollee visit to these
providers with dates, procedures per-
formed, diagnoses, etc.) in October 2000
and April 2001, respectively. However, fol-
lowing complaints from MCOs about the
burden of reporting encounter data, CMS
suspended data collection in May 2001,
ultimately adopting a drastically stream-
lined data reporting strategy (discussed
later). 
CMS evaluated several risk-adjustment
models that use both ambulatory and inpa-
tient diagnoses, including ACGs (Weiner et
al., 1996), the chronic disease and disabili-
ty payment system (CDPS) (Kronick et al.,
2000), clinical risk groups (CRGs)
(Hughes et al., 2004), the clinically detailed
risk information system for cost (CD-RISC)
(Kapur et al., 2003), and DCG/HCCs
(Pope et al, 2000b). CMS chose the
DCG/HCC model for Medicare risk-adjust-
ment, largely on the basis of transparency,
ease of modification, and good clinical
coherence. The DCG/HCC model, part of
the same DCG family of models as the PIP-
DCG, was developed with CMS funding by
researchers at RTI International2 and
Boston University, with clinical input from
physicians at Harvard Medical School.3
Prior to implementing Medicare risk-
adjustment in 2004, the DCG/HCC model
developers and CMS staff adapted the orig-
inal model for consistency with CMS’ sim-
plified data collection, and for customized
fit for Medicare subpopulations. The
resulting CMS-HCC model reflects these
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2 The early development of the DCG/HCC model was done by
Health Economics Research, Inc. while under contract to CMS.
However, RTI International acquired Health Economics
Research, Inc. in 2002.
3 The original version of the DCG/HCC model is described in
Ellis et al. (1996). The DCG/HCC model has been refined as
described in Pope et al., 1998 and 2000b.
Medicare-specific adaptations of the
DCG/HCC model and provides a compre-
hensive framework for Medicare risk-
adjustment. 
This article describes the DCG/HCC
and CMS-HCC models. The next section
describes the DCG/HCC model, including
the principles and elements of its diagnos-
tic classification system and how its perfor-
mance compares to earlier models. We
then describe the modifications to accom-
modate the simplified data that lead to the
CMS-HCC model. The final section
describes the CMS-HCC model adapta-
tions for subpopulations.
DCG/HCC MODEL PRINCIPLES
Diagnostic Classification System 
The following ten principles guided the
creation of the diagnostic classification sys-
tem.
Principle 1—Diagnostic categories should
be clinically meaningful. Each diagnostic
category is a set of ICD-9-CM codes
(Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2004). These codes should all
relate to a reasonably well-specified disease
or medical condition that defines the cate-
gory. Conditions must be sufficiently clini-
cally specific to minimize opportunities for
gaming or discretionary coding. Clinical
meaningfulness improves the face validity
of the classification system to clinicians, its
interpretability, and its utility for disease
management and quality monitoring. 
Principle 2—Diagnostic categories
should predict medical expenditures.
Diagnoses in the same HCC should be rea-
sonably homogeneous with respect to their
effect on both current (this year’s) and
future (next year’s) costs. (In this article
we present prospective models predicting
future costs.)
Principle 3—Diagnostic categories that
will affect payments should have adequate
sample sizes to permit accurate and stable
estimates of expenditures. Diagnostic cate-
gories used in establishing payments
should have adequate sample sizes in avail-
able data sets. Given the extreme skewness
of medical expenditure data, the data can-
not reliably determine the expected cost of
extremely rare diagnostic categories.
Principle 4—In creating an individual’s
clinical profile, hierarchies should be used
to characterize the person’s illness level
within each disease process, while the
effects of unrelated disease processes
accumulate. Because each new medical
problem adds to an individual’s total dis-
ease burden, unrelated disease processes
should increase predicted costs of care.
However, the most severe manifestation of
a given disease process principally defines
its impact on costs. Therefore, related con-
ditions should be treated hierarchically,
with more severe manifestations of a con-
dition dominating (and zeroing out the
effect of) less serious ones.
Principle 5—The diagnostic classifica-
tion should encourage specific coding.
Vague diagnostic codes should be grouped
with less severe and lower-paying diagnos-
tic categories to provide incentives for
more specific diagnostic coding.
Principle 6—The diagnostic classifica-
tion should not reward coding prolifera-
tion. The classification should not measure
greater disease burden simply because
more ICD-9-CM codes are present. Hence,
neither the number of times that a particu-
lar code appears, nor the presence of addi-
tional, closely related codes that indicate
the same condition should increase pre-
dicted costs. 
Principle 7—Providers should not be
penalized for recording additional diag-
noses (monotonicity). This principle has
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two consequences for modeling: (1) no
condition category should carry a negative
payment weight, and (2) a condition that is
higher-ranked in a disease hierarchy
(causing lower-rank diagnoses to be
ignored) should have at least as large a
payment weight as lower-ranked condi-
tions in the same hierarchy.
Principle 8—The classification system
should be internally consistent (transitive).
If diagnostic category A is higher-ranked
than category B in a disease hierarchy, and
category B is higher-ranked than category
C, then category A should be higher-
ranked than category C. Transitivity
improves the internal consistency of the
classification system, and ensures that the
assignment of diagnostic categories is
independent of the order in which hierar-
chical exclusion rules are applied.
Principle 9—The diagnostic classifica-
tion should assign all ICD-9-CM codes
(exhaustive classification). Since each
diagnostic code potentially contains rele-
vant clinical information, the classification
should categorize all ICD-9-CM codes.
Principle 10—Discretionary diagnostic
categories should be excluded from pay-
ment models. Diagnoses that are particu-
larly subject to intentional or unintentional
discretionary coding variation or inappro-
priate coding by health plans/providers, or
that are not clinically or empirically credi-
ble as cost predictors, should not increase
cost predictions. Excluding these diag-
noses reduces the sensitivity of the model
to coding variation, coding proliferation,
gaming, and upcoding.
In designing the diagnostic classifica-
tion, principles 7 (monotonicity), 8 (transi-
tivity), and 9 (exhaustive classification)
were followed absolutely. For example, if
the expenditure weights for our models did
not originally satisfy monotonicity, we
imposed constraints to create models that
did. Judgment was used to make tradeoffs
among other principles. For example, clin-
ical meaningfulness (principle 1) is often
best served by creating a very large num-
ber of detailed clinical groupings. But a
large number of groupings conflicts with
adequate sample sizes for each category
(principle 3). Another tradeoff is encourag-
ing specific coding (principle 5) versus pre-
dictive power (principle 2). In current cod-
ing practice, non-specific codes are com-
mon. If these codes are excluded from the
classification system, substantial predictive
power is sacrificed. Similarly, excluding
discretionary codes (principle 10) can also
lower predictive power (principle 2). We
approached the inherent tradeoffs involved
in designing a classification system using
empirical evidence on frequencies and pre-
dictive power, clinical judgment on related-
ness, specificity, and severity of diagnoses,
and the judgment of the authors on incen-
tives and likely provider responses to the
classification system. The DCG/HCC mod-
els balance these competing goals to
achieve a feasible health-based payment
system.
Elements and Organization
As shown in Figure 1, the HCC diagnos-
tic classification system first classifies each
of over 15,000 ICD-9-CM codes into 804
diagnostic groups, or DxGroups. Each
ICD-9-CM code maps to exactly one
DxGroup, which represents a well-speci-
fied medical condition, such as DxGroup
28.01 Acute Liver Disease. DxGroups are
further aggregated into 189 Condition
Categories, or CCs.4 CCs describe a
broader set of similar diseases, generally
organized into body systems, somewhat
like ICD-9-CM major diagnostic categories.
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4 Most CCs are assigned entirely with ICD-9-CM codes. But CCs
185-189 are assigned by beneficiary utilization of selected types
of DME, such as wheelchairs. CC 173, Major Organ Transplant,
is defined by procedure codes only. CC 129, ESRD is defined by
Medicare entitlement status. None of these CCs are included in
the CMS-HCC model. 
Although they are not as homogeneous as
DxGroups, CCs are both clinically- and
cost-similar. An example is CC 28 Acute
Liver Failure/Disease that includes
DxGroups 28.01 and 28.02 Viral Hepatitis,
Acute or Unspecified, with Hepatic Coma.
Hierarchies are imposed among related
CCs, so that a person is only coded for the
most severe manifestation among related
diseases. For example (Figure 2), ICD-9-CM
Ischemic Heart Disease codes are organized
in the Coronary Artery Disease hierarchy,
consisting of 4 CCs arranged in descending
order of clinical severity and cost, from CC
81 Acute Myocardial Infarction to CC 84
Coronary Athlerosclerosis/Other Chronic
Ischemic Heart Disease. A person with an
ICD-9-CM code in CC 81 is excluded from
being coded in CCs 82, 83, or 84 even if codes
that group into those categories were also
present. Similarly, a person with ICD-9-CM
codes that group into both CC 82 Unstable
Angina and Other Acute Ischemic Heart
Disease, and CC 83 Angina Pectoris/Old
Myocardial Infarction is coded for CC 82, but
not CC 83. After imposing hierarchies, CCs
become Hierarchical Condition Categories,
or HCCs.5
Although HCCs reflect hierarchies
among related disease categories, for unre-
lated diseases, HCCs accumulate. For exam-
ple, a male with heart disease, stroke, and
cancer has (at least) three separate HCCs
coded, and his predicted cost will reflect
increments for all three problems. The HCC
model is more than simply additive because
some disease combinations interact. For
example, the presence of both Diabetes and
Congestive Heart Failure (CHF) could
increase predicted cost by more (or less)
than the sum of the separate increments for
people who have diabetes or CHF alone. 
We tested 35 two- and three-way interac-
tions among six common and high-cost
chronic diseases defined by HCCs or
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Hierarchies 
Imposed 
ICD-9-CM Codes 
(n = 15,000+)
Diagnostic Groups
(n = 804)
Condition Categories
(n = 189)
Hierarchical 
Condition Categories
NOTE: ICD-9-CM is International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification.
SOURCE: (Pope et al., 2000b.)
Figure 1
Hierarchical Condition Categories Aggregations of ICD-9-CM Codes
5 The full list of hierarchies used in the CMS-HCC model is avail-
able on request from the authors.
groups of HCCs: diabetes, cerebrovascular
disease, vascular disease, or chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
CHF, and coronary artery disease (Pope et
al., 2000b), as well as three interactions of
several of these conditions with renal fail-
ure.6 Simple additivity yields most of the
explanatory power, in the sense that
adding all 38 interactions barely increased
the base DCG/HCC model’s R2 (from
11.10 to 11.13 percent). However, six inter-
actions were substantial in magnitude, sta-
tistically significant, and clinically plausi-
ble. Hence, to improve clinical face validity
and predictive accuracy for important sub-
groups of beneficiaries, we include them in
the DCG/HCC model. For example, the
simultaneous presence of CHF and COPD
leads to higher expected costs than would
be calculated by adding the separate incre-
ments for CHF and COPD alone.
Because a single beneficiary may be
coded for none, one, or more than one
DxGroup or HCC, the DCG/HCC model
can individually price tens of thousands of
distinct clinical profiles using fewer than
200 parameters. The model’s structure
thus provides, and predicts from, a detailed
comprehensive clinical profile for each
individual.
HCCs are assigned using hospital and
physician diagnoses from any of five
sources: (1) principal hospital inpatient; (2)
secondary hospital inpatient; (3) hospital
outpatient; (4) physician; and (5) clinically-
trained non-physician (e.g., psychologist,
podiatrist). The DCG/HCC model does
not distinguish among sources; in particu-
lar, it places no premium on diagnoses
from inpatient care. Using Medicare 5-per-
cent sample FFS data, we investigated
adding diagnoses from other sources
(Pope et al., 2000b). Adding diagnoses
from home health providers raised the
explanatory power of the base model from
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Acute Myocardial Infarction
Unstable Angina and Other Acute 
Ischemic Heart Disease
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Myocardial Infarction
Coronary Atherosclerosis/Other 
Chronic Ischemic Heart Disease
SOURCE: (Pope et al., 2000b.)
Figure 2
Hierarchical Condition Categories Coronary Artery Disease Hierarchy
6 In later work unpublished work, we also examined all two-way
interactions of cancer with the other six diagnoses, but did not
find any significant effects. 
11.15 to 11.65 percent. Further adding
diagnoses from DME suppliers raised the
explanatory power from 11.65 to 11.85 per-
cent. All other sources of diagnoses either
add no predictive power (SNF, ASC, or hos-
pice) or detract from predictive power
(clinical laboratory and radiology/imaging
clinics). Diagnoses assigned by home
health and DME providers are likely to be
less reliable than those assigned by physi-
cians or other providers with greater clini-
cal training. Diagnoses from laboratory
and imaging tests are also problematic
given the significant proportion of rule-out
diagnoses. In implementing the CMS-HCC
model, potential gains in predictive power
from using additional sources were bal-
anced against the costs of collecting and
auditing these data; the decision was to
only ask MCOs to collect diagnoses from
the five baseline sources previously listed. 
Consistent with principle 10, we excluded
discretionary diagnostic categories (HCCs)
from the preliminary prospective payment
model. We excluded diagnoses that were
vague/non-specific (e.g., symptoms), discre-
tionary in medical treatment or coding (e.g.,
osteoarthritis), not medically significant
(e.g., muscle strain), or transitory or defini-
tively treated (e.g., appendicitis). We also
excluded HCCs that did not (empirically)
add to costs, and finally, the five HCCs that
were defined by the presence of procedures
or use of DME, because, as much as possi-
ble, we wanted payments to follow what
medical problems were present as opposed
to what services were offered.7 Altogether,
we excluded 88 of the 189 HCCs, leaving 101
HCCs in the preliminary prospective pay-
ment model. As discussed further, addition-
al HCCs were excluded from the final, 70-
category CMS-HCC model.
The DCG/HCC model also relies on
demographics. Demographic adjusters
included in the model are 24 mutually
exclusive age/sex cells (e.g., female, age
65-69), an indicator for at least 1-month of
Medicaid enrollment in the base year (a
poverty indicator), and an indicator of orig-
inally disabled status. The age cells distin-
guish beneficiaries currently entitled to
Medicare by age (65 or over) versus dis-
ability (under 65); a separate, explicit aged
versus disabled entitlement status indica-
tor would be redundant. The originally dis-
abled indicator distinguishes beneficiaries
who are currently age 65 or over, but were
first entitled to Medicare before age 65 by
disability. The age/sex, Medicaid, and
originally disabled categories add to each
other and to the HCC diagnostic cate-
gories.8 The demographic variables are
the same as have been used in the PIP-
DCG model, and are discussed at greater
length elsewhere (Pope et al., 2000a).
Figure 3 displays a hypothetical clinical
vignette of a female age 79, eligible for
Medicaid and diagnosed with acute
myocardial infarction (AMI), angina pec-
toris, COPD, renal failure, chest pain, and
an ankle sprain. Note that although this
female receives CCs for both AMI and
angina, she receives no HCC for angina
because AMI is a more severe manifesta-
tion of coronary artery disease. Also note
that while payment includes additive incre-
ments for females age 75-79 (demographic
categories not shown in Figure 3),
Medicaid, AMI, COPD, and renal failure,
the HCCs for major symptoms and other
injuries are excluded from the payment cal-
culation. Chest pain is a symptom associat-
ed with a variety of medical conditions
ranging from minor to serious, and sprains
are transitory, with minimal implications
for next year’s cost. 
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7 The DME HCCs were developed to predict costs associated
with functional impairment not captured by diagnoses. Although
they did improve prediction for the functionally impaired, sub-
stantial under-prediction remained (Pope et al., 2000b; Kautter
and Pope, 2001). 
8 We did not systematically investigate interactions of age and
sex with HCCs (diagnoses). This is a subject for future research.
PERFORMANCE OF DCG/HCC AND
PIP-DCG MODELS
The predictive accuracy of risk-adjust-
ment models is typically judged by the R2
statistic (percentage of variation explained)
to measure predictive accuracy for individ-
uals and predictive ratios (ratios of mean
predicted to mean actual expenditures for
subgroups of beneficiaries) to measure
predictive accuracy for groups. The R2 of
age/sex, PIP-DCG, and DCG/HCC models
as measured on 1996-1997 Medicare’s 5-
percent sample FFS data are: age/sex, 1.0
percent; PIP-DCG, 6.2 percent; and
DCG/HCC, 11.2 percent. 
Adding PIP-DCG to demographic predic-
tors (age/sex) increases predictive power
sixfold. Adding secondary inpatient and
ambulatory diagnoses (hospital outpatient
and physician), and arraying them in a
multi-condition cumulative model (DCG/
HCC) nearly doubles the power again.
Besides the R2, another interesting sum-
mary statistic is the percentage of payments
based on demographic variables: 100 
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ICD-9-CM DxGroup CC HCC
410.91 AMI of
unspecified site, initial
episode of care
413.9 Other and
unspecified angina
pectoris
491.2 Obstructive
chronic bronchitis
518.1 Interstitial
emphysema
586 Renal failure,
unspecified
585 Chronic renal
failure
Included
Excluded
81.01 AMI, initial
episode of care
83.02 Angina
pectoris
108.01 Emphysema/
chronic bronchitis
131.06 Renal failure,
unspecified
131.05 Chronic renal
failure
81 AMI
83 Angina pectoris/
old myocardial
infarction
108 COPD
131 Renal failure
81 AMI
166 Major
symptoms,
abnormalities
166 Major
symptoms,
abnormalities
166.18 Chest pain786.5 Chest pain
162.12 Sprains845.00 Ankle sprain
108 COPD
131 Renal failure
162 Other injuries 162 Other injuries
NOTES: AMI is acute myocardial infarction. COPD is chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
SOURCE: (Pope et al., 2000b.)
Figure 3
Clinical Vignette for Hierarchical Condition Categories Classification 79 Year Old Female with
AMI, Angina Pectoris, COPD, and Renal Failure
percent in a demographic model, 81 percent
in the PIP-DCG model, but only 43 percent
in the DCG/HCC model (Pope et al., 2001).
With over one-half of payments determined
by diagnoses, the DCG/HCC model moves
decisively away from the AAPCC demo-
graphic-based payment system.
Table 1 shows predictive ratios for
selected groups of Medicare beneficiaries.
Ratios close to 1.0 indicate accurate predic-
tion of costs; less than 1.0, under predic-
tion; and, more than 1.0, over prediction.
The PIP-DCG model improves substantial-
ly on age/sex, and in almost all cases, the
DCG/HCC model improves significantly
on the PIP-DCG model. This is true even
for hospitalizations, where the PIP-DCG
model distinguishes between those hospi-
talized or not, while the DCG/HCC model
makes no distinction by source of diagno-
sis.9 Despite the DCG/HCC model’s
impressive gains over the age/sex and
PIP-DCG models, it still under-predicts for
the most expensive and most often hospi-
talized beneficiaries.
CMS-HCC MODEL
This section describes how the
DCG/HCC model was modified before
implementation as the M+C risk adjuster
for capitation payments in 2004. We will
refer to the modified model as CMS-HCC. 
DCG/HCC Model Modification to
Simplify Data Collection
When several MCOs withdrew from the
M+C program around the year 2000, CMS
sought to improve plan retention. Since
some MCOs had complained of the burden
of collecting encounter data for risk-adjust-
ment, CMS sought to develop risk adjust-
ment models that predict well and rely on
ambulatory data, but with reduced data col-
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Table 1
Predictive Ratios1 for Alternative Risk-Adjustment Models
Category Model
Quintiles of Expenditures Age/Sex PIP-DCG DCG/HCC
First (Lowest) 2.66 2.09 1.23
Second 1.93 1.54 1.23
Third 1.37 1.10 1.14
Fourth 0.95 0.84 1.02
Fifth (Highest) 0.44 0.75 0.86
Top 5 Percent 0.28 0.61 0.77
Top 1 Percent 0.17 0.47 0.69
Hospitalizations
None 1.33 1.07 1.03
1 0.63 1.02 1.02
2 0.44 0.91 0.98
3 or More 0.26 0.69 0.82
Diagnoses2
Heart Failure 0.47 0.74 0.97
Heart Attack 0.45 0.78 0.98
COPD 0.59 0.79 0.99
Hip Fracture 0.56 0.83 0.99
Depression 0.54 0.77 0.92
Colorectal Cancer 0.60 0.78 0.98
Cerebral Hemorrhage 0.44 0.73 1.04
1 Mean predicted cost divided by mean actual cost.
2 From either inpatient or ambulatory setting.
NOTES: Expenditures, hospitalizations, and diagnoses are measured in the base year. COPD is chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
SOURCE: (Pope et al., 2000b.)
9 The DCG/HCC model captures multiple conditions that might
be diagnosed in multiple inpatient stays, whereas the PIP-DCG
model captures only the single principal inpatient diagnosis
most predictive of future costs if multiple inpatient stays occur.
lection requirements. One measure of the
data collection burden imposed by a model
is its number of diagnostic categories.10
We investigated the relationship between
number of diagnostic categories used in the
DCG/HCC model and its predictive power
(Pope et al., 2001). Figure 4 plots the rela-
tionship between number of diagnostic cat-
egories and model explanatory power mea-
sured by R2. Diagnostic categories (HCCs)
were entered into the model in descending
order of their incremental explanatory
power using stepwise regression. The base
model (with zero HCCs) includes 26 demo-
graphic variables, the 24 age/sex cells, and
Medicaid and originally disabled status. Its
R2 is 1.69 percent. 
The incremental contribution to predic-
tive power declines rapidly with the number
of diagnostic categories added to the model.
The first diagnostic category entered by the
stepwise regression is CHF, which more
than doubles the demographic model R2 to
4.11 percent. The second condition category
entered is COPD, raising the R2 to 4.94 per-
cent. This is an incremental gain of 0.83 per-
centage points, substantial, but much less
then the increment of 2.42 percentage points
due to CHF. With 5 HCCs included, 61 per-
cent of the maximum explanatory power of
the full (101 HCC) model is attained; with 10
HCCs, 74 percent of the maximum is
achieved; with 20, 85 percent, and with 30, 90
percent. The incremental R2 from adding a
diagnostic category is 0.48 percentage
points at 5 HCCs; 0.26 percentage points at
10 HCCs; 0.08 percentage points at 20 HCCs;
and 0.05 percentage points at 30 HCCs.
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Figure 4
Model Explanatory Power as a Function of Number of Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC)
10 The relationship between number of diagnostic categories and
data collection burden is controversial. Some MCOs seemed to
feel that it would be less burdensome to report all diagnoses,
which CMS allows. 
This analysis shows that a parsimonious
risk-adjustment model with a substantially
reduced number of diagnostic categories is
almost as predictive as a full model. But
parsimony has a cost. In limiting the num-
ber of conditions that affect payment, many
serious, high-cost diagnoses—especially
rare ones—will be ignored. MCOs
enrolling beneficiaries with excluded diag-
noses will be disadvantaged, and beneficia-
ries with such conditions may not be well
served by MCOs.
CMS considered these results, and con-
sulted with clinicians, on the tradeoff
between number of diagnostic categories
and predictive power, and also other crite-
ria for diagnostic categories to include in
risk adjustment, such as well-defined diag-
nostic criteria and clinical coherence and
homogeneity. It was important that the
HCC hierarchies not be disrupted by dele-
tion of higher-ranked HCCs while lower-
ranked HCCs were retained. After this
process, CMS selected 70 HCCs to include
in the CMS-HCC model. The choices
reflect a balance among the competing
considerations of reducing data collection
burden, maximizing predictive power,
including rare, high-cost conditions, and
selecting only well-defined and clinically
coherent conditions. Generally, the higher-
cost, more severe conditions at the top of
the HCC disease hierarchies were
retained, while some lower-cost, more fre-
quent and more discretionary conditions at
the bottom of the hierarchies were pruned.
For example, in the coronary artery dis-
ease hierarchy, AMI (heart attack), other
acute IHD (e.g., unstable angina), and
angina pectoris/old myocardial infarction
were retained, but chronic IHD (e.g., coro-
nary atherosclerosis) was excluded.
After the CMS-HCC model was finalized,
a list of approximately 3,000 of the more
than 15,000 ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes was
identified that are sufficient to define the
model’s 70 HCCs. In addition, because the
CMS-HCC model does not give extra cred-
it for multiple reports of the same diagno-
sis, MCOs need only report a single
encounter during the relevant year of data
collection that establishes the diagnosis.
The information required for the single
encounter is: (1) beneficiary identification
number, (2) date (to establish that the diag-
nosis was made during the relevant report-
ing period), (3) setting (to establish that
the diagnosis was made in one of the
allowed hospital or physician settings), and
(4) ICD-9-CM diagnosis code. In short,
MCOs are required to report only the min-
imum. 
Concern about the quality of diagnostic
reporting is the greatest in physician
offices, where diagnoses have not hereto-
fore affected payment, and recording of
diagnoses is less rigorously practiced than
in hospitals. The auditing standard that
CMS has promulgated for reporting of
physician office diagnoses is that a physi-
cian has established the diagnosis in the
medical record, and that medical coders
have recorded it in accordance with ICD-9-
CM rules. CMS will conduct coding audits,
but not clinical audits. That is, CMS will
require MCOs to demonstrate that a diag-
nosis is present in the medical record on
the specified date and has been coded
according to ICD-9-CM. CMS will not
require clinical verification of these diag-
noses, such as diagnostic test results.
CMS-HCC Model Calibration 
We calibrated the CMS-HCC model to
1999-2000 Medicare 5-percent sample FFS
data for beneficiaries entitled by age or dis-
ability (beneficiaries entitled by ESRD
were excluded). The model is prospective,
meaning that diagnoses collected in a base
year (1999) are used to predict expendi-
tures in the following year (2000). An
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important operational change from the
PIP-DCG model is that the data lag will be
eliminated, making the application of the
model consistent with its calibration. With
the PIP-DCG model, the data collection
period for a payment year ended 6 months
before the start of the year, i.e., on June 30
of the previous year, so that final capitation
rates could be published by January 1 of
the payment year. With the CMS-HCC
model, provisional rates will be established
by January 1 based on 6-month lagged
data, and final rates will be available by
June 30 of the payment year based on the
previous calendar year’s diagnoses. A rec-
onciliation process will adjust the first 6
months of payments to the final rates, if
necessary.
A standard set of sample restrictions was
employed to ensure a population of benefi-
ciaries with complete 12-month base year
diagnostic profiles and complete payment
year Medicare expenditures from the FFS
claims for aged and disabled beneficiaries
(Pope et al., 2000b). Decedents are includ-
ed in the payment year for their eligible
period. Complete FFS claims are not avail-
able for months of M+C enrollment or
when Medicare is a secondary payer, and
M+C plans are not responsible for hospice
care, so these months were excluded from
our sample. The final sample size is
1,337,887 beneficiaries.
We summed all Medicare payments for a
beneficiary for months in 2000 satisfying
our sample restrictions, excluding (1)
deductibles and copayments paid by the
beneficiary; (2) hospice payments; and (3)
indirect medical education payments.
Hospice and indirect medical education
payments are excluded because they were
not included in M+C capitation rates, but
were paid directly to hospices and teaching
hospitals utilized by M+C enrollees.
Payments were annualized by dividing
them by the fraction of months in 2000 that
satisfy our sample restrictions; all analyses
are weighted by this eligibility fraction. In
general, annualization and weighting
ensures that monthly payments are cor-
rectly estimated for all beneficiaries,
including those who died (Ellis et al.,
1996).11
The model was calibrated using weight-
ed least squares multiple regression. The
CMS-HCC regression model estimated for
the combined aged and disabled Medicare
population is shown in Table 2. 
The elements of the model are:
• Age/sex cells (24).
• Medicaid interacted with sex and
age/disabled entitlement status.
• Originally disabled status interacted with
sex.
• HCC diagnostic categories (70).
• Interactions of diagnostic categories
with entitlement by disability (5).
• Disease interactions (6). 
The R2 for this model is 9.8 percent.
Several coefficients are constrained
because the unconstrained coefficients vio-
late the principle that higher-ranked condi-
tions in a hierarchy should have higher
predicted costs, or for other reasons.12
As an example of expenditure predic-
tion, consider our hypothetical scenario in
Figure 3 of a female age 79 eligible for
Medicaid diagnosed with AMI, angina pec-
toris, COPD, renal failure, chest pain, and
an ankle sprain. The female receives the
following incremental cost predictions:
female, 75 to 79, $2,562; aged, female,
Medicaid, $616; AMI (HCC 81), $1,885;
angina pectoris, $0; COPD (HCC 108),
$1,936; renal failure (HCC 131), $2,908;
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11 In our calibration, we did not make any geographic adjust-
ments to Medicare payments. In past work, we have found that
deflating payments by a geographic input price index had little
effect on estimated risk-adjustment model parameters. 
12 Clinical consultants to CMS suggested that metastatic cancer
is not consistently correctly coded, so HCCs 7 and 8 were con-
strained to have equal coefficients. HCCs 81 and 82 were con-
strained to have equal coefficients because the ICD-9-CM diag-
nostic detail CMS collects from health plans is not sufficient to
distinguish them. 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Summer 2004/Volume 25, Number 4 131
Table 2
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-Hierarchical Condition Categories (CMS-HCC)
Combined, Community, and Institutional Models
Models
Combined Community Institutional
Number of Observations 1,337,887 1,291,308 65,593
R2 0.0977 0.0976 0.0596
Adjusted R2 0.0977 0.0976 0.0589
Dependent Variable Mean 5,352 5,213 8,937
Root Mean Square Error 13,407 13,337 15,954
Model Parameters 105 105 50
Variable Parameter Parameter Parameter
Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Female
0-34 Years 678 3.81 598 3.36 5,457 11.72
35-44 Years 1,110 8.82 1,012 8.03 5,457 11.72
45-54 Years 1,177 11.20 1,096 10.40 5,457 11.72
55-59 Years 1,463 11.87 1,360 11.00 5,457 11.72
60-64 Years 1,996 17.26 1,924 16.56 5,457 11.72
65-69 Years 1,648 42.11 1,572 40.15 5,970 11.73
70-74 Years 2,061 60.25 1,970 57.42 6,049 17.09
75-79 Years 2,562 71.59 2,475 68.56 5,089 19.63
80-84 Years 2,998 71.39 2,936 68.34 4,813 22.51
85-89 Years 3,360 63.45 3,408 61.01 4,515 23.28
90-94 Years 3,683 46.81 4,077 46.25 4,048 19.08
95 Years or Over 3,128 23.27 4,130 25.32 2,980 10.34
Male
0-34 Years 405 2.72 346 2.32 5,664 13.77
35-44 Years 701 6.63 617 5.81 5,664 13.77
45-54 Years 1,059 12.15 973 11.14 5,664 13.77
55-59 Years 1,460 13.42 1,386 12.68 5,664 13.77
60-64 Years 1,824 17.90 1,755 17.13 5,664 13.77
65-69 Years 1,827 41.47 1,774 40.28 7,435 13.24
70-74 Years 2,380 59.66 2,323 58.17 6,350 14.34
75-79 Years 3,031 69.04 2,960 67.13 6,210 16.45
80-84 Years 3,454 62.03 3,372 59.83 6,201 17.67
85-89 Years 4,129 52.24 4,050 49.80 6,366 17.40
90-94 Years 4,505 32.20 4,620 31.08 5,378 11.29
95 Years or Over 4,753 15.83 5,307 15.89 4,287 5.34
Medicaid and Originally Disabled 
Interactions with Age and Sex
Medicaid-Female-Disabled 1,141 11.31 1,133 11.18 __ __
Medicaid-Female-Aged 616 12.91 940 18.18 __ __
Medicaid-Male-Disabled 632 6.80 592 6.31 __ __
Medicaid-Male-Aged 788 10.33 944 11.62 __ __
Originally Disabled-Female 1,231 17.34 1,213 16.44 __ __
Originally Disabled-Male 809 11.66 757 10.73 __ __
Disease Coefficients Label
HCC1 HIV/AIDS 3,587 13.16 3,514 12.88 6,893 5.42 C1
HCC2 Septicemia/Shock 4,365 34.74 4,563 32.92 4,854 13.89
HCC5 Opportunistic Infections 3,643 10.43 3,346 9.29 6,893 5.42 C1
HCC7 Metastatic Cancer and 
Acute Leukemia 7,438 81.16 7,510 81.00 2,771 4.54
HCC8 Lung, Upper Digestive Tract, 
and Other Severe Cancers 7,438 81.16 7,510 81.00 2,771 4.54
HCC9 Lymphatic, Head and Neck,
Brain, and Other 
Major Cancers 3,540 35.91 3,539 35.51 2,319 3.50
HCC10 Breast, Prostate, Colorectal
and Other Cancers 
and Tumors 1,209 26.35 1,194 25.79 1,330 4.01
Refer to NOTES at end of table.
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Table 2—Continued
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-Hierarchical Condition Categories (CMS-HCC)
Combined, Community, and Institutional Models
Models
Combined Community Institutional
Parameter Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Disease Coefficients Label
HCC15 Diabetes with Renal or Peripheral 
Circulatory Manifestation 3,827 37.71 3,921 36.90 3,137 10.49
HCC16 Diabetes with Neurologic or
Other Specified Manifestation 2,931 30.09 2,833 28.43 3,137 10.49
HCC17 Diabetes with Acute 
Complications 2,056 7.84 2,008 7.41 3,137 10.49
HCC18 Diabetes with 
Ophthalmologic  or 
Unspecified Manifestation 1,839 18.35 1,760 17.32 3,137 10.49
HCC19 Diabetes without Complication 1,055 26.10 1,024 25.02 1,308 5.32
HCC21 Protein-Calorie Malnutrition 3,818 27.52 4,727 29.77 2,193 6.49
HCC25 End-Stage Liver Disease 4,496 14.91 4,616 14.92 1,375 5.09
HCC26 Cirrhosis of Liver 2,727 11.93 2,645 11.37 1,375 5.09
HCC27 Chronic Hepatitis 1,839 6.73 1,841 6.71 1,375 5.09
HCC31 Intestinal Obstruction/
Perforation 1,997 21.69 2,094 21.62 1,375 5.09
HCC32 Pancreatic Disease 2,336 17.30 2,281 16.61 1,375 5.09
HCC33 Inflammatory Bowel Disease 1,574 10.25 1,575 10.16 1,375 5.09
HCC37 Bone/Joint/Muscle Infections/
Necrosis 2,629 19.68 2,546 18.41 2,539 4.42
HCC38 Rheumatoid Arthritis and 
Inflammatory Connective 
Tissue Disease 1,683 27.72 1,653 26.93 1,463 3.61
HCC44 Severe Hematological 
Disorders 5,055 30.80 5,188 30.69 2,299 4.08
HCC45 Disorders of Immunity 4,224 26.77 4,260 26.64 2,299 4.08
HCC51 Drug/Alcohol Psychosis 1,571 6.57 1,810 6.99 1,131 6.06
HCC52 Drug/Alcohol Dependence 1,477 6.15 1,361 5.44 1,131 6.06
HCC54 Schizophrenia 2,592 26.75 2,786 27.04 1,131 6.06
HCC55 Major Depressive, Bipolar, 
and Paranoid Disorders 2,024 30.00 2,209 30.85 1,131 6.06
HCC67 Quadriplegia, Other 
Extensive Paralysis 5,665 27.45 6,059 27.20 504 3.94
HCC68 Paraplegia 5,665 27.45 6,059 27.20 504 3.94
HCC69 Spinal Cord Disorders/
Injuries 2,484 17.77 2,526 17.45 504 3.94
HCC70 Muscular Dystrophy 2,239 3.82 1,981 3.27 504 3.94
HCC71 Polyneuropathy 1,480 19.74 1,377 18.06 504 3.94
HCC72 Multiple Sclerosis 2,329 11.44 2,654 12.19 504 3.94
HCC73 Parkinson’s and Huntington’s 
Diseases 1,954 19.69 2,436 22.04 504 3.94
HCC74 Seizure Disorders and 
Convulsions 1,334 17.25 1,381 16.68 504 3.94
HCC75 Coma, Brain Compression/
Anoxic Damage 2,396 7.88 C1 2,912 8.62 C1 504 3.94 C2
HCC77 Respirator Dependence/
Tracheostomy Status 10,417 29.54 10,783 28.46 7,259 8.19
HCC78 Respiratory Arrest 7,543 20.23 7,327 18.79 7,259 8.19
HCC79 Cardio-Respiratory Failure 
and Shock 3,451 42.70 3,550 42.39 1,481 4.31
HCC80 Congestive Heart Failure 2,055 38.48 2,141 38.54 903 4.16
HCC81 Acute Myocardial Infarction 1,885 31.23 1,785 29.13 1,476 5.75
HCC82 Unstable Angina and Other 
Acute Ischemic Heart 
Disease 1,885 31.23 1,785 29.13 1,476 5.75
HCC83 Angina Pectoris/Old 
Myocardial 1,246 22.82 1,205 21.76 1,476 5.75
Infarction
Refer to NOTES at end of table.
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Summer 2004/Volume 25, Number 4 133
Table 2—Continued
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-Hierarchical Condition Categories (CMS-HCC)
Combined, Community, and Institutional Models
Models
Combined Community Institutional
Parameter Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Disease Coefficients Label
HCC92 Specified Heart Arrhythmias 1,362 31.73 1,363 30.95 961 4.62
HCC95 Cerebral Hemorrhage 1,901 10.05 2,011 9.88 774 4.01
HCC96 Ischemic or Unspecified Stroke1,498 20.90 1,569 20.34 774 4.01
HCC100 Hemiplegia/Hemiparesis 1,678 13.96 2,241 16.61 504 3.94
HCC101 Cerebral Palsy and Other 
Paralytic Syndromes 767 3.34 840 3.42 504 3.94 C2
HCC104 Vascular Disease with 
Complications 3,432 36.22 3,473 35.49 2,612 6.30
HCC105 Vascular Disease 1,662 39.94 1,832 41.72 583 3.72
HCC107 Cystic Fibrosis 1,936 45.73 1,929 44.87 1,180 4.69
HCC108 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease 1,936 45.73 1,929 44.87 1,180 4.69
HCC111 Aspiration and Specified 
Bacterial Pneumonias 3,010 20.47 3,556 21.53 2,377 6.82
HCC112 Pneumococcal Pneumonia, 
Empyema, Lung Abscess 1,151 6.55 1,034 5.68 2,377 6.82
HCC119 Proliferative Diabetic 
Retinopathy and 
Vitreous Hemorrhage 1,975 13.36 1,791 11.96 5,102 5.46
HCC130 Dialysis Status 15,926 26.97 15,778 25.96 15,959 5.82
HCC131 Renal Failure 2,908 23.20 2,954 22.73 2,152 6.26
HCC132 Nephritis 1,541 6.95 1,401 6.23 2,152 6.26
HCC148 Decubitus Ulcer of Skin 3,888 32.32 5,285 37.28 1,628 5.98
HCC149 Chronic Ulcer of Skin, Except 
Decubitus 2,381 26.76 2,485 26.65 1,346 3.98
HCC150 Extensive Third-Degree 
Burns 4,427 2.36 4,935 2.54 1,274 3.37
HCC154 Severe Head Injury 2,396 7.88 C1 2,912 8.62 C1 1,274 3.37
HCC155 Major Head Injury 1,211 8.43 1,239 8.08 1,274 3.37 C3
HCC157 Vertebral Fractures w/o 
Spinal Cord Injury 2,462 20.64 2,514 20.23 504 3.94 C2
HCC158 Hip Fracture/Dislocation 1,301 13.37 2,010 18.51 0 —
HCC161 Traumatic Amputation 3,965 17.86 C2 4,322 17.92 C2 1,274 3.37 C3
HCC164 Major Complications of 
Medical Care  and Trauma 1,438 18.25 1,346 16.60 1,347 3.66
HCC174 Major Organ Transplant Status 3,790 8.55 3,702 8.37 4,523 11.13
HCC176 Artificial Openings for Feeding 
or Elimination 3,810 23.84 4,054 22.39 4,523 11.13
HCC177 Amputation Status, Lower 
Limb/Amputation 
Complications 3,965 17.86 C2 4,322 17.92 C2 1,274 3.37 C3
Disabled/Disease Interactions
D-HCC5 Disabled Opportunistic 
Infections 3,965 5.49 4,047 5.52 — —
D-HCC44 Disabled Severe 
Hematological Disorders 4,649 9.98 4,580 9.72 — —
D-HCC51 Disabled Drug/Alcohol 
Psychosis 2,830 7.12 2,608 6.32 — —
D-HCC52 Disabled Drug/Alcohol 
Dependence 2,160 6.90 2,122 6.61 — —
D-HCC107 Disabled Cystic Fibrosis 9,691 6.70 9,547 6.63 — —
Refer to NOTES at end of table.
chest pain, $0; and ankle sprain, $013
(Table 2). Her total cost prediction is the
sum of these increments, or $9,907.
Calibration of DCG/HCC models on sev-
eral years of data reveals increasingly thor-
ough diagnostic coding. For example, if
1999 diagnoses are used to predict expen-
ditures with a model calibrated on
1996/1997 data, mean expenditures will be
over predicted. If more complete coding
over time is not accounted for, MCOs will
be overpaid by the use of current diag-
noses with a model calibrated on historical
data. CMS makes a slight downward
adjustment in HCC-predicted expenditures
to account for this.
CMS-HCC Models for Subpopulations
Medicare beneficiaries differ along char-
acteristics that are important for risk adjust-
ment. First, they may be entitled to
Medicare in one of three ways: age, disabili-
ty, or ESRD. Second, some beneficiaries
reside in institutions rather than in the com-
munity. Third, some enrollees are new to
Medicare and do not have complete diag-
nostic data. Fourth, Medicare is a secondary
payer for some beneficiaries. To account for
the different cost and diagnostic patterns of
these disparate subgroups of beneficiaries,
the CMS-HCC model was adapted for
Medicare subpopulations. This section
describes models for subpopulations.14
Beneficiaries Entitled by Disability
Approximately 12 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries are entitled to Medicare
because they are under age 65 and have a
medical condition that prevents them from
working (the disabled). Models calibrated
on the full Medicare population (excluding
ESRD eligibles), mostly reflect cost pat-
terns among the elderly, the other 88 per-
cent of the population. The implications of
some diagnoses might differ between the
elderly and disabled. For example, a diag-
nosis that is disabling may be more severe,
and the cost of treating a disease may vary
by age. We considered allowing differ-
ences in incremental expenditure weights
for some diagnoses (HCCs) for the dis-
abled (Pope et al., 1998; 2000b).
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Table 2—Continued
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services-Hierarchical Condition Categories (CMS-HCC)
Combined, Community, and Institutional Models
Models
Combined Community Institutional
Parameter Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Disease Interactions
INT1 DM-CHF1 1,265 14.62 1,296 14.46 1,064 2.91
INT2 DM-CVD 490 4.05 639 4.89 — —
INT3 CHF-COPD 1,261 14.82 1,238 14.06 1,906 4.95
INT4 COPD-CVD-CAD 316 1.49 406 1.82 — —
INT5 RF-CHF1 857 3.94 1,202 5.24 — —
INT6 RF-CHF-DM1 4,185 18.48 4,433 18.71 — —
NOTES: Beneficiaries with the three-way interaction RF-CHF-DM are excluded from the two-way interactions DM-CHF and RF-CHF. DM is diabetes
mellitus (HCCs 15-19). CHF is congestive heart failure (HCC 80). COPD is chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (HCC 108). CVD is cerebrovas-
cular disease (HCCs 95-96, 100-101). CAD is coronary artery disease (HCCs 81-83). RF is renal failure (HCC 131). "|" means coefficients of HCCs
are constrained to be equal. C1, C2, and C3 denote non-contiguous constraints.
SOURCE: Pope, G.C. and Kautter, J., RTI International, Ellis, R.P. and Ash, A.S., Boston University, Ayanian, J.Z., Harvard Medical School and
Brigham and Women's Hospital, Iezzoni, L.I., Harvard Medical School and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Ingber, M.J., Levy, J.M., and
Robst, J., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Analysis of 1999-2000 Medicare 5% Standard Analytic File (SAF).
13 The female receives no incremental cost prediction for angina
pectoris because AMI is higher-ranked in the coronary artery
disease hierarchy and excludes angina. No incremental predic-
tion is made for chest pain and ankle sprain because these diag-
noses are not included in the CMS-HCC model.
14 Risk-adjustment models for ESRD-entitled and functionally-
limited beneficiaries are not described in this article. 
Using Medicare’s 5-percent sample FFS
data (1996-1997), we estimated the
DCG/HCC model separately on aged and
disabled subsamples. We evaluated differ-
ences in age versus disabled parameter
estimates according to their statistical sig-
nificance, magnitude, clinical plausibility,
and frequency of occurrence in the dis-
abled population (Pope et al., 2000b).
Based on these considerations, we chose
nine diagnostic categories to receive incre-
mental payments when they occur among
disabled beneficiaries. Five of these cate-
gories remained significantly different for
the disabled when the CMS-HCC model
was re-estimated on 1999-2000 data: oppor-
tunistic infections, severe hematological
disorders (e.g., hemophilia, sickle cell ane-
mia), drug/alcohol psychosis, drug/alco-
hol dependence, and cystic fibrosis.
Incremental annual payments for these
conditions among the disabled (in addition
to base payments for the elderly) are sub-
stantial, ranging from $2,160 to $9,691. 
Other than for these five conditions, dis-
ease risk-adjustment weights are the same
for the aged and disabled populations. The
CMS-HCC model is estimated on a com-
bined sample of aged and disabled benefi-
ciaries, with disabled interactions for these
five diagnostic categories. The combined
aged/disabled model is shown in Table 2.
Community and Institutional
Residents
Using the newly available Medicare
MDS, we identified long–term nursing
home residents in the current (i.e., pay-
ment) year. Long-term nursing home resi-
dence was defined as continuously resid-
ing in a nursing home for at least 90 days,
as indicated by a 90-day clinical assess-
ment reported by the nursing facility
through the MDS. In our prospective risk-
adjustment modeling sample of 1,337,887
beneficiaries, 65,593 beneficiaries, or 5 per-
cent, had at least 1 month of long-term
nursing facility residence in 2000.15
Table 3 compares sample sizes and
mean expenditures by demographic cate-
gories for community and institutional res-
idents, and shows predictive ratios from
the CMS-HCC model calibrated on the
combined community/institutional sample
(Table 2). Nearly one-half (49 percent) of
long-term nursing facility residents are age
85 or over. Facility residents are only 2 per-
cent of the combined community plus insti-
tutional population for females age 70 to 74,
but fully 37 percent of the combined popu-
lation for females age 95 or over. 
Overall, institutional residents are 71
percent more expensive than community
residents, $8,937 in mean annualized
expenditures compared to $5,213. The age
profiles of expenditures are quite different.
Among community residents, mean expen-
ditures rise steadily with age in the under
65 disabled population and then again in
the elderly population, except for a slight
decline for the oldest females. In contrast,
among the institutionalized, mean expendi-
tures are fairly constant across all ages
until they decline significantly among the
oldest old. For all age/sex cells except the
oldest old, mean expenditures for the insti-
tutionalized are substantially higher than
for community-dwelling beneficiaries. 
However, although not shown in Table 3,
among beneficiaries diagnosed with partic-
ular HCCs, mean expenditures for the
institutionalized are often similar to those
of community residents. For example,
among all beneficiaries with CHF (HCC
80), expenditures for the institutionalized
are $11,719, which is $255 less than for
community residents. More generally,
when classifying people by the presence of
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15 Beneficiaries with both community and long-term institutional
months in the same year are included in both samples, weight-
ed by the fraction of their total months alive in the year in each
status. 
a single diagnosis, expenditures for the
institutionalized may be higher, lower, or
about the same. 
Thus, the main reason that people in
facilities cost more is that they have more
medical problems, a distinction that is fully
accounted for by the HCCs. In fact, the pre-
dictive ratios from the combined CMS-
HCC model for community and institution-
al beneficiaries are, respectively, 0.99 and
1.12 (Table 3). This means that the com-
bined model, on average, under predicts
expenditures for community residents by 1
percent, and over predicts expenditures for
long–term nursing home residents by 12
percent. Lower expenditures among facili-
ty residents adjusting for disease burden
could result from substituting non-
Medicare for Medicare-reimbursed ser-
vices; since most nursing home service are
not reimbursed by Medicare. Also, greater
monitoring of nursing home than commu-
nity residents may identify and prevent
problems leading to hospitalization. The
under-prediction for community residents
and over-prediction for facility residents is
most severe for the oldest age groups,
most likely due to decisions to limit 
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Community and Institutionalized Residents
Community Institutional 
Mean Mean
Annualized Predictive Annualized Predictive
Variable Observations Expenditures Ratio1 Observations Expenditures Ratio1
Overall 1,291,308 5,213 0.99 65,593 8,937 1.12
Demographics
Female
0-34 Years 7,007 3,623 1.00 49 9,251 0.99
35-44 Years 15,566 4,332 1.00 199 9,395 0.94
45-54 Years 22,077 4,692 1.00 473 8,869 1.07
55-59 Years 14,023 5,254 1.00 343 10,168 0.91
60-64 Years 15,793 5,993 1.00 501 9,906 1.04
65-69 Years 129,970 3,714 1.00 1,380 10,961 0.99
70-74 Years 171,775 4,372 1.00 3,098 10,901 0.97
75-79 Years 157,586 5,260 1.00 6,260 9,458 1.08
80-84 Years 111,303 6,101 0.99 9,801 8,797 1.13
85-89 Years 66,301 6,882 0.97 12,294 8,054 1.19
90-94 Years 26,852 7,606 0.92 9,535 7,146 1.29
95 Years or Over 8,074 7,338 0.83 4,729 5,734 1.42
Male
0-34 Years 10,272 2,868 1.00 106 10,622 0.95
35-44 Years 22,913 3,666 1.00 384 9,596 0.92
45-54 Years 29,377 3,968 1.00 606 10,186 0.91
55-59 Years 16,391 4,651 1.00 438 10,340 0.96
60-64 Years 18,581 5,214 1.00 588 10,486 1.00
65-69 Years 105,856 4,018 1.00 1,132 12,432 0.88
70-74 Years 128,874 5,014 1.00 1,921 11,501 0.99
75-79 Years 106,402 6,207 1.00 2,842 11,411 1.04
80-84 Years 64,263 7,083 1.00 3,404 11,049 1.06
85-89 Years 30,765 8,144 0.99 3,116 10,754 1.08
90-94 Years 9,343 8,731 0.97 1,783 9,489 1.20
95 Years or Over 1,944 9,062 0.92 611 8,096 1.37
Medicaid 196,604 6,523 0.97 33,074 8,895 1.17
Originally-Disabled 81,894 7,614 0.99 7,415 10,606 1.11
1 Ratio of mean expenditures predicted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services - Hierarchical Condition Categories (CMS-HCC) model for
combined community/institutional samples to mean actual expenditures.
SOURCE: Pope, G.C. and Kautter, J., RTI International, Ellis, R.P. and Ash, A.S., Boston University, Ayanian, J.Z., Harvard Medical School and
Brigham and Women's Hospital, Iezzoni, L.I., Harvard Medical School and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Ingber, M.J., Levy, J.M., and
Robst, J., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Analysis of 1999-2000 Medicare 5% Standard Analytic File (SAF).
aggressive care for very old residents in
nursing homes. The over-prediction of the
costs of the institutionalized, together with
their different cost patterns by age and
diagnosis, led us to consider differentiating
the CMS-HCC model for community and
institutional populations.
Within a multiple regression model esti-
mation framework, we investigated alter-
native approaches to allowing differences
in the model between community and insti-
tutional residents, ultimately choosing to
estimate separate models. This properly
calibrates the prediction of each group’s
costs, while allowing all demographic and
disease coefficients to differ between com-
munity and institutional populations.
In addition to the combined model,
Table 2 shows the CMS–HCC community
and institutional models. Not surprisingly,
the community model R2 and most of the
demographic and disease coefficients are
very similar to the combined model,
because community residents comprise 95
percent of the combined sample. A few
coefficients show greater differences. The
community coefficients for the oldest age
cells are significantly larger than the com-
bined model coefficients because the
lower-cost very old institutionalized have
been removed from these cells. The com-
munity coefficients for the aged enrolled in
Medicaid are also significantly higher, as
are several HCC coefficients.
The institutional model R2 is consider-
ably lower than the community model. But
some of the community model’s predictive
power comes from distinguishing benefi-
ciaries who are healthy (no diagnoses) ver-
sus sick (with diagnoses), while the insti-
tutional model is explaining cost variations
among a population comprised entirely of
impaired individuals. Diagnoses help
explain why someone might be institution-
alized (i.e., distinguish healthy from sick),
but are not as powerful in explaining
expenditure differences among the institu-
tionalized. Disease (HCC) coefficients
tend to be smaller in the institutional
model than in the community model
(Table 2). Diagnoses are less predictive of
incremental costs among the more uni-
formly expensive institutional population
than they are among the community popu-
lation.
We constrained certain groups of demo-
graphic and diagnostic coefficients in the
institutional model to be equal (Table 2),
because the small available sample of insti-
tutionalized beneficiaries resulted in their
low prevalence in some diagnostic cate-
gories (HCCs) and made it difficult to
obtain stable estimates of each separate
parameter. For the same reason, we includ-
ed no disabled interaction terms, and only
two of the disease interaction terms in the
institutional model. Also, HCC 158 Hip
Fracture/Dislocation was excluded because
its coefficient was negative.
The age/sex coefficients for the institu-
tionalized are much higher than for com-
munity residents except for the oldest
ages. This implies that institutionalized
beneficiaries are predicted to be expensive
regardless of their diagnostic profile (e.g.,
even lacking any of the diagnoses included
in the CMS-HCC model), whereas commu-
nity residents are predicted to be expen-
sive only if diagnosed with at least one of
the serious diseases included in the CMS-
HCC model. This makes sense since insti-
tutionalization itself is a marker of poor
health, aside from diagnostic profile, but
the institutionalized age/sex coefficients
decline for the oldest ages, and fall below
the community coefficients. Medical treat-
ment may be less aggressive for old, frail
beneficiaries who are institutionalized. 
Among the institutional population, the
coefficient for Medicaid was negative and
the coefficients for originally disabled was
statistically insignificant. These variables
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were excluded from the institutional
model. Beneficiaries often qualify for
Medicaid after spending down their per-
sonal assets to pay for a lengthy nursing
home stay. Thus, Medicaid may be a proxy
for beneficiaries in the later portion of their
stays, when they are less expensive than in
the earlier, post-acute phase of their nurs-
ing home tenure.
New Medicare Enrollees
The CMS–HCC model requires a com-
plete 12-month base year diagnostic profile
to predict the next year’s expenditures.
Beneficiaries without 12 months base year
Medicare enrollment, but at least 1 month
of prediction year enrollment, are defined
as new enrollees. About two–thirds of new
enrollees are age 65.16 New enrollees may
be under age 65 if they become eligible for
Medicare by disability; they may be over
age 65 if they delay Medicare enrollment
or are not originally enrolled in both Parts
A and B.17 We developed a demographic
model to predict expenditures for new
enrollees who lack the data needed to
apply the CMS-HCC model.
Table 4 presents frequencies and mean
annualized expenditures from the 5-per-
cent FFS sample data for new enrollees
and continuing enrollees. Continuing
enrollees are defined as beneficiaries hav-
ing 12 months of Parts A and B Medicare
enrollment in the base year and at least 1
month in the prediction year. For female
and male new enrollees age 65, mean annu-
alized expenditures are $2,729 and $2,900,
respectively, less than one-half of costs of
continuing enrollees ($6,952 for female
and $6,055 for male). For almost all new
enrollees age 65, the original reason for
Medicare entitlement is age.18 In contrast,
continuing enrollees age 65 were originally
entitled to Medicare by disability, and
hence are much more expensive. For other
ages, mean expenditures of new and con-
tinuing enrollees are much more similar.
To achieve sufficient sample sizes in all age
ranges to calibrate the new enrollees
model, we merged the new and continuing
enrollees samples, which resulted in a sam-
ple size of 1,495,225 with mean expendi-
tures of $5,184. For age 65, actual new
enrollees dominate the combined sample,
and the cost weight reflects their (low) rel-
ative costs. Continuing enrollees age 65
are included in the sample to calibrate the
originally disabled coefficient for age 65.
For other than age 65, the sample is domi-
nated by continuing enrollees, but their
costs appear to proxy actual new enrollee
costs reasonably well for younger or older
ages.
Beneficiaries for Whom Medicare is a
Secondary Payer
Working aged beneficiaries are Medicare
beneficiaries, age 65 or over, with private
group health insurance coverage from their
or their spouse’s employer. By law,
Medicare is a secondary payer for these
beneficiaries. The primary private health
plan must pay for medical expenses to the
extent of its defined benefits. Only if
Medicare covers services not covered by
the private plan, or has more generous cov-
erage (e.g., lower deductibles or copay-
ments) for Medicare-covered services, is
Medicare responsible for payment, and
then only to the extent of the difference in
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16 To simplify the new enrollees model, we recoded new
enrollees age 64 on February 1 with an original reason for
Medicare entitlement of aged to age 65. Thus, the age 65 cell in
the new enrollees model combines new enrollees ages 64 and 65
on February 1 of the prediction year whose original reason for
entitlement is aged. 
17 For example, a beneficiary might be entitled to Part A (hospi-
tal insurance) by age at age 65 or over, but might not pay Part B
(physician insurance) premium until an older age.
18 Some age 65 new enrollees might have originally been entitled
to Medicare by disability when under age 65, but then have
rejoined the work force and lost their Medicare eligibility, only
to re-enroll at age 65.
coverage. Medicare expenditures for work-
ing aged beneficiaries are lower for this rea-
son, as well as because working may be a
proxy for better health.19 Estimation of a
separate model for the working aged is not
feasible with the sample sizes available from
the Medicare’s 5-percent FFS sample. A
simple adjustment to CMS–HCC model pre-
dictions is a multiplier that scales cost pre-
dictions to be lower for these beneficiaries.
We defined the working aged as benefi-
ciaries otherwise satisfying the require-
ments of our 1999-2000 aged/disabled
prospective modeling sample who had at
least 1 month of working aged status in the
prediction year (2000). There are 19,057
beneficiaries in our working aged sample,
or about 1.4 percent as many individuals as
in our aged/disabled sample. The mean
annualized expenditures of the working
aged are $966, less than one-fifth as much
as for the aged/disabled community sam-
ple ($5,213). The CMS–HCC community
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for New and Continuing Medicare Enrollees1
New Enrollees2 Continuing Enrollees3
Mean Mean
Annualized Annualized
Age/Sex Category Observations Expenditures Observations Expenditures
Female
0-34 Years 2,540 3,532 7,037 3,653
35-44 Years 3,685 4,341 15,717 4,385
45-54 Years 5,891 4,814 22,431 4,767
55-59 Years 4,029 4,903 14,277 5,354
60-64 Years 3,310 5,705 16,159 6,094
65 Years 58,946 2,729 3,336 6,952
66 Years 1,448 3,319 29,534 3,401
67 Years 845 3,349 31,560 3,684
68 Years 531 3,116 32,578 3,740
69 Years 504 3,608 33,893 3,905
70-74 Years 1,311 4,672 173,829 4,461
75-79 Years 471 5,063 161,843 5,387
80-84 Years 200 6,043 118,144 6,276
85-89 Years 95 8,111 75,186 7,035
90-94 Years 46 5,931 34,135 7,500
95 Years or Over 15 6,457 11,886 6,795
Male
0-34 Years 3,434 3,089 10,342 2,934
35-44 Years 4,281 3,690 23,172 3,746
45-54 Years 5,820 4,099 29,814 4,074
55-59 Years 4,120 4,603 16,677 4,772
60-64 Years 4,196 4,775 18,986 5,346
65 Years 46,262 2,900 3,940 6,055
66 Years 1,546 3,205 24,472 3,644
67 Years 872 2,976 25,279 3,933
68 Years 570 3,501 25,915 4,145
69 Years 490 3,638 27,009 4,295
70-74 Years 1,223 5,700 130,148 5,087
75-79 Years 429 6,476 108,214 6,307
80-84 Years 144 5,916 66,505 7,231
85-89 Years 63 8,028 32,848 8,326
90-94 Years 19 13,027 10,601 8,827
95 Years or Over 2 3,221 2,420 8,867
1 Aged and disabled beneficiaries. Excludes working aged and ESRD beneficiaries.
2 Enrollees with less than 12 months of base year eligibility.
3 Enrollees with 12 months of base year eligibility.
SOURCE: Pope, G.C. and Kautter, J., RTI International, Ellis, R.P. and Ash, A.S., Boston University, Ayanian, J.Z., Harvard Medical School and
Brigham and Women's Hospital, Iezzoni, L.I., Harvard Medical School and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Ingber, M.J., Levy, J.M., and
Robst, J., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Analysis of 1999-2000 Medicare 5% Standard Analytic File (SAF).
19 Throughout this section, we use the terms working and work-
ing aged to include both those who are actually working, and the
spouses of those who are working.
model over-predicts mean working aged
expenditures by a factor of 3.66.
Essentially, we define the working aged
multiplier as the ratio of mean actual to
mean predicted expenditures for the work-
ing aged sample, where expenditures are
predicted by the CMS-HCC community
model. With an adjustment for beneficia-
ries who have a mixture of working aged
and non-working-aged months in the pay-
ment year, the working aged multiplier is
0.215.
CONCLUSIONS
CMS’ adaptation of the DCG/HCC
model makes substantially more accurate
predictions of medical costs for M+C
enrollees than has previously been possi-
ble. Its use is intended to redirect money
away from MCOs that cherry-pick the
healthy, while providing the MCOs that
care for the sickest patients the resources
to do so. The ultimate purpose of the CMS-
HCC payment model is to promote fair
payments to MCOs that reward efficiency
and encourage excellent care for the
chronically ill. The CMS-HCC model will
continue to evolve. Additional diagnoses
may be needed to predict drug expendi-
tures incurred under the drug benefit
enacted by MMA (2003). The model may
need to be recalibrated to reflect new treat-
ment patterns and disease prevalence.
Diagnosis-based risk adjustment may need
to be coordinated with disease manage-
ment programs and incentives for quality
of care.
The model has evolved over two decades
of research,20 with careful attention to clin-
ical credibility, real-world incentives and
feasibility tradeoffs. Continuous feedback
between government technical staff and
policymakers at CMS on the one hand, and
research organization and academic
researchers on the other, has shaped the
CMS-HCC model. Much of the recent
research reported in this article has relat-
ed to adapting the model for Medicare sub-
populations. The use of a single modeling
framework—the CMS-HCC model—pro-
vides unity and organization to the sub-
group models with the unique features spe-
cific to certain types of beneficiaries.
Comprehensive risk adjustment, based on
ambulatory as well as inpatient diagnoses,
is just beginning to be implemented. Thus,
it is too early to tell whether it will achieve
its goals. As risk adjustment continues to
be incorporated in Medicare payments to
MCOs, it will be important to evaluate its
impact on these organizations and the ben-
eficiaries they serve, especially organiza-
tions that care for the chronically ill and
their enrollees. This will tell us a great deal
about the feasibility and consequences of
matching health care resources to needs.
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